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doubt of it; but had it been possible, I cannot doubt that it would have been better without denying the validity of the moral, and of a great many other judgments that we actually make. I have not denied that the universe is the best of all possible universes: an imaginable universe is not necessarily a possible universe.

Professor Mackenzie has written a suggestive, stimulating, and thoroughly interesting book. He has given us emphatically a *multum in parvo*; the best compliment that one can pay to such a book is to say that it makes one look forward eagerly to a fuller development of its leading ideas, chiefly, that is, a development of the leading ideas contained in the concluding chapters, such as he promises us in the preface.

H. RASHDALL.

NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD.

DER INTELEKTUALISMUS IN DER GRIECHISCHEN ETHIK. By Max Wundt. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1907. Pp. 103.

According to Dr. Wundt, intellectualism in Greek ethics occurs in three forms. The first of these he traces to the Homeric praises of the advantage of cool and clever reflection over passionate and headlong action; the second to the sacred knowledge of magic formulas by which the various mysteries professed to fortify the initiate against the perils and mischances which might beset him in the house of Hades; the third to the practical efficiency and skill in the management of circumstances which always formed so striking an aspect of Greek ideas of "virtue" (or excellence). "Homeric," "mystic," and "practical" intellectualism are first fused together in the Platonic system, and the complete intellectualism thus engendered continued (with varying degrees of emphasis) to dominate Greek ethics to the end, although the later Neoplatonists revert almost completely to the standpoint of primitive magic. All this is worked out in an interesting and suggestive way, though it is clear that Dr. Wundt has no great sympathy with the intellectualist treatment of ethics, and even ventures to call its inability to admit the reality of conscious ill-doing a "curious prejudice."

Nevertheless it may be doubted whether Dr. Wundt has not conceived intellectualism somewhat too broadly to bring out its

characteristic flavor. The full oddity of Greek ethics resides not so much in the intellectualizing tendencies which he has analyzed out, but in the peculiar twist given to them when they are combined in the intellectualism of Plato, whose rôle is certainly not overstated. For it is a mistake to suppose that all intellectualizing must lead to intellectualism, or that every protest against intellectualism is a depreciation of the intellect. The real issue in the dispute between intellectualism and voluntarism is as to the nature of what is called the intellect. Now all ethical reflection is bound to intellectualize in some sense. It is by nature intellectual reflection on action. Ethics is not merely an idle spectator of the tangled knots our passions weave. However much our morality, *i. e.*, moral conduct, may depend on feeling, moral theory (*i. e.*, ethics) cannot be conceived as constituted, thereby. We must distinguish, therefore, between intellectualism and an appeal to intellection. In point of fact all the three tendencies stigmatized by Dr. Wundt extend far beyond the borders of Greek ethics. They are natural and world-wide in their occurrence and do not elsewhere lead to the Greek paradoxes. Hence is it instructive to inquire why in Greece extreme intellectualism is evolved.

It is pretty clear, in the first place, that the facts on which the Homeric praise of self-control is a reflection, are quite universal. It is everywhere obviously salutary to restrain impulses and to refrain from hasty action. Indeed this fact of experience is the chief reason why intellect has been developed at all; why "the reason" has to contend with and to overcome "the desires" in the successful types of man. It only means man's recognition of the fact that his superiority depends on the development of his intelligence and that *vis consili expers mole ruit sua*.

Similarly the "mystic" and "practical" intellectualisms are at bottom hardly more than recognitions of the vital value of religion and science. In all early religions the learning of magic formulas, by which man is wishful to believe that he can control the mysterious powers around him, plays a great part. But these formulas are in no wise the creations of pure reason. They are the offspring of man's wishes, and their intellectual pretensions soon vanish when we inquire how they were discovered, how they work, and how their grotesque and contradictory behests can be combined into a rational system of thought. When thus threatened with exposure, they invariably take refuge in mystery, and so

betray the thinness of their rational texture. Mysticism claims often to be rational, and its attitude is often rationalistic; but though it may pretend to know, its "knowledge" will never stand rational testing.

"Practical" intellectualism, on the other hand, has nothing mysterious about it. In its origin it is essentially the moral homage very rightly paid to the skill of the expert who knows how to make, and so how to achieve.

Thus in none of these cases is "intellectualism" the real aim of an intellectualizing which is thoroughly natural, practical and pragmatic in its functioning. The caste-mark of Greek intellectualism on the other hand is not constituted by the discovery (made by all men to some extent) of these uses of the intellect, nor even by their combination in a single ethical system; it is to be found in the peculiar way in which the Greeks combined them, and arrived at an idolatry of *useless* intellect.

This achievement must in all probability be ascribed to Plato. For the purpose with which, and the sense in which, the Sophists advocated knowing were certainly practical; and the historic Socrates probably agreed with them in this respect. He did not, that is, inquire what virtue or excellence was, in order to rise to a contemplation of transcendent ideals. He merely wished to improve the regulation of human conduct. And his homely illustrations from the handicrafts were merely intended to suggest that morality was a science, in order that men might no longer make it a playground of arbitrary opinions. Unfortunately the analogy was soon pressed out of all rational shape, though not perhaps by Socrates himself. It was taken to mean that virtue was *in every way* analogous to science, and in fact nothing but science. Whence it followed inevitably that "incontinence" was unthinkable.

But even these excesses of logical analogy would hardly have sufficed to generate a full-blown intellectualism, if Plato had not intervened. The exigences of his polemics constrained him to identify ethical with epistemological "sensationalism," and to rescue (as he thought) knowledge from human corruptions by relegating it to an ideal world of unchanging "forms." He managed thereby to throw the centre of gravity of ethics over into a transcendent world of dehumanized abstractions, and to set them up as the true (but unattainable) objects of human reverence. Thus with one stroke he severed the connection between the

sensible and the intelligible, between the intellect and its functioning, between the true and the practical, between "theoretic" and vital values, between the excellence of the good man and of the wise. Platonism is as important for the history of ethics as for that of logic.

Thus the Platonic synthesis was not merely a combining of pragmatic intellectualizings; it was the setting up of a highly original intellectualism which tried to soar far above all human interests, and yet at the same time to uplift man beyond himself into a superhuman sphere. As such it could not be a success. It was too untrue to life to last, too unkind to man to be accepted by men, too incoherent to be translated from the language of myth into that of science. But it is no derogation from Plato's genius to admit that he was bound to fail. The wonder is how nearly he succeeded, and how indelibly his thought has marked all thought that followed. He still dictates most of our moral and intellectual prejudices, and in Greek philosophy even the revolts against his influence were too half-hearted to succeed. Thus Aristotle no doubt perceived that the facts of life are constantly refuting Plato's identification of the sage with the saint, and exhibiting his impotence. But having detected the incongruity, he does not reject its premisses; he prefers instead to lapse into a dualism between theory and practice, and to maintain that nevertheless the sage is somehow a higher being than the merely good man.

The failure of mankind to emancipate itself from the false values to which Plato first gave currency, is hardly less striking. The discrepancy between the human and the ideal which Plato had vainly tried to overcome, and Aristotle had fixed with characteristic precision, evoked no doubt a practical reply in the shape of a widespread refusal to cultivate the philosophies which refused to concern themselves with the "good for man." When Platonic intellectualism had made it clear that its highest knowledge had no real reference to human uses, the inference was no doubt clearly drawn that, if so, it had no interest for man. But though the exaggerated claims of pure intellect were practically rebuked by the turning away of men from the philosophies which asserted them to other schemes of thought more indulgent to the needs of conduct, no theoretic refutation of Plato's assumptions was attempted. Perhaps the Stoics and Epicureans who gained great popularity by their interest in human ethics had already lost

their theoretic interest too completely to attempt this; at any rate they did not contest the theoretic superiority of a highest life conceived according to the regulation pattern of Platonic intellectualism. Even the sceptics never dared to doubt that the discovery of intellectual contradictions in the working values of life amounted to a *destruction* of their value. Philosophers simply refused to recognize that human institutions often continue to work in spite of, or even by reason of, the fact that they are infected by what may (abstractly) be represented as self-contradiction. It is only quite recently that men have come to perceive that the fundamental assumptions of Platonic intellectualism are (1) that the source of values must be regarded as transcending human experience; and (2) that the way to secure such ideals is to put them out of relation to that experience. That both these assumptions are utterly false is what we are slowly coming to suspect.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

AN OUTLINE OF THE IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF EXPERIENCE.

By J. B. Baillie, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. xx, 344.

Professor Baillie is already known to philosophical students as the author of a book on Hegel's Logic, from which it became at once apparent that he was a writer of genuine ability who had given a great deal of attention to the works of modern idealists, more particularly to those of Hegel. Some defects were also pretty readily discernible. The exposition was not always lucid; and it was somewhat doubtful whether the views put forward were always quite coherent. The book, however, sufficed to raise the hope in the minds of many readers that Mr. Baillie would before long produce other works of a similar character in which such defects would no longer be apparent. The book now before us to some extent realizes these hopes; but it is to be feared that to a large extent it will prove a disappointment. Like the previous book, it is in the main concerned with the exposition of the Hegelian point of view; and, like the previous book, it is characterized by a deeply sympathetic appreciation of that point of view, as well as by a competent knowledge of other philosophi-